


THE
C R I S I S.

For now fits Expectation in the Air.

SHAKESP.



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THE C R I S I S.

THE problematic state of Europe being now, we hope, at the eve of a happy solution, it calls upon every man of sense and property to give his thoughts so far a political turn, as to enquire on what foundation the present war is constructed, what plan is proposed for the conducting it, and what may be the probable issue.

It is unnecessary here to shew how deeply interested Great Britain is in the event; an event in which every man of property is intimately concerned for his possessions, and every man without possessions for his liberty: both must flourish or fade, as the

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war

war is well founded, pursued with spirit, and finished with address.

As we must engage in a war, in which nothing but the fate of arms can give either side the advantage, it naturally leads us to consider what treaties are made, what alliances formed, what forces are allotted to balance the adverse power, and with what stock of wealth, or by what judicious measures, such a war is to be supported.

A great depth of politics seems not requisite to comprehend that the skill, address, situation, attention, and cautious conduct of the king of Prussia commands the regard of every curious eye; and that without a third part of the dominions or forces of some other monarchs, seems yet to hold the scales wherein is balanced the fate of kingdoms; not by his own force, but by judiciously uniting with such powers, as without him are faint, but with him have, at least, the appearance of considerable superiority. Hence reflecting in what a singular manner the present war has commenced, a prudent man naturally concludes, that this monarch is specially engaged in the British alliance. In my own
mind,

mind, I am fully persuaded, that he is so engaged; as I would not presume the minuteſt want of diſcretion in our miniſtry, or that they would ſet the fate of this crown and kingdom on a leſs hazard, ſo neither ſhould I merit credit in this particular, did I not propoſe to ſupport theſe ſuggeſtions by certain facts.

There has long been a real, or ſeeming difference between the courts of London and Berlin, the grounds of which, and the cauſe of its continuance, is not immediately to my preſent purpoſe; but it may not be impertinent to ſhew how a change has been brought about as introductory to the preſent ſyſtem.

It is ſome few years paſt, that a certain noble perſonage, ſince removed to another court, in a free converſation with his P—n M—y, hinted the neceſſity and uſe of a friendly union, not only between the reſpective electorates, but alſo with the court of L——n, as the moſt natural means of putting a full ſtop to the encroachments and over-bearing power of France, which by degrees would probably as much endanger Germany hereafter, as it did now the Auſtrian Netherlands. That prince

replied, " Your observation is very just,
 " and you only in this repeat, what sprung
 " originally from the penetrating genius
 " of my late cousin king William ; it is
 " indeed in itself very obvious, and would
 " naturally take place, was not the house
 " of Austria as much too powerful for me at
 " present, as France may be for the whole
 " Empire in the future; and as it is evident-
 " ly my interest that neither be too potent,
 " so it is that I can always command the as-
 " sistance of one or the other. And as
 " the interests of the courts of L—n and
 " V—a are intimately connected, and Si-
 " lesia not under the security of a gua-
 " rantee, it would induce any man of com-
 " mon sense in the like case, to act in the
 " favour of that power, from whom he
 " has most to hope, and least to fear. On
 " the contrary, whenever I can reconcile
 " to my understanding the measures of the
 " court of V—a in respect to me, all the
 " rest would naturally follow.— You
 " see of what little use the N—ds are to
 " the h—e of A—a, they neither barrier
 " the D—h, improve trade, nor produce
 " significant revenues. L——n, &c. are
 " the native right of the E—r, and the
 " Nether-

“ Netherlands in proper hands would be
 “ of excellent service to the alliance that
 “ might be formed, and into which his
 “ S——n M——y ought to be assiduously
 “ courted, in which light something might
 “ be effected for the common benefit.”

This conversation, 'tis said, was communicated to a certain gentleman then in power, whose discretion was never questioned, but had prescribed himself particular bounds, beyond which, he had determined never to adventure; and therefore, while he admired the thought, he declined engaging in what appeared to him too complex an enterprize: but did not at the same time decline a farther communication of the subject matter to his intimate friends in whom he singularly confided, and mentioned it as an affair that might probably succeed under the direction of a more bold and spirited m——r. As matters of this kind, in whatever prudent hands entrusted, are apt gradually to transpire in loose hints and obscure reflections, the meaning was understood by more than one, long before any opening in the c——l, or the scheme in any sense ripe for execution; and in consequence, various plans formed in the
 closets

closets of different political designers : but that which fired the imagination of all who were admitted into the secret, was framed by a gentleman too well known in the political world, and his superior knowledge of foreign affairs, to need any mention in this place. The essence of which is,

“ That an alliance be formed wherein
 “ the king of Prussia be made a leading
 “ party, to detach him from France—Pro-
 “ pose a certain share of the Austrian Ne-
 “ therlands and a sea port.—The house
 “ of Austria equivalent districts in Al-
 “ face and election of the Arch-duke.—
 “ That the king of Prussia command the
 “ allied troops in the Netherlands, and
 “ that the whole power of the house of
 “ Austria may be enabled to act on the
 “ side of Alsace. Subsidial troops must be
 “ obtained from Denmark, Saxony, or
 “ Russia, and the king of Sardinia enga-
 “ ged to defend the imperial dominions in
 “ Italy. His share to be, &c. what is not
 “ proper at present to mention.” It hap-
 pened very luckily for this scheme, that a
 certain prince had reasons enough to ac-
 quit himself of all former obligations to
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the power with whom he had been long engaged, as having been treated at once with a deceit and narrowness, that is hardly to be parallel'd at any time in similar cases, and would but ill suit the disposition of a person who was not only an exact performer of treaties himself, but also such a judicious oeconomist, as to make his revenues exactly coincide with his undertakings, without running the state in debt, or being, on casual emergencies, at any loss for proper resources: therefore, whenever his finances failed by the pitifulness or poverty of his capital ally, it affected him in a very different manner than it would have done any other prince, not equally delicate in point of reputation. And as what was now proposed appearing to him infinitely preferable to his former engagements, as being an independant acquisition balanced against uncertainty and dependance, a person so discerning could not doubt which was most eligible.

In this situation it was very perceivable, to a common eye, what must necessarily be the result; for as on the one side, the troops of the allies by much outnumber those of France by land, so does the British

tish navy that of France by sea. And while the forces of France cannot be drawn to the southward, it is evident with what facility the king of Sardinia will support himself and defend Italy. For, however it may be matter of conversation, that the court of France have several hundred thousand men in pay, there are few who reflect, that if no part of this great body shall be able to traverse beyond their native boundaries, or live on their adversaries at discretion, the finances of France will not be long able to support them, so that the good or evil of such numbers essentially depends on the measures taken by those who are, or ought to be properly prepared. And I should think, that however careless other states may be in this particular, it materially concerns the court of Berlin to be suitably provided; and as that court has never yet failed on like occasions, it is an idle presumption even to suppose it will, at so important and delicate a crisis, when the fate of Europe is in effect staked against the courage, address, and fortunes of France. At all events, necessity has put us upon making the experiment, and I hope shall not on
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our parts fail in duely executing our engagements, either by a faint war, or an untimely or indiscreet peace, as the same reasons will not pass with the people as heretofore, " the pretence of wanting money:" for, were that true, how came we so soon enabled to engage in a fresh war, with a prospect before us of adding at least, thirty millions more to the public debt? And tho' I must confess that the prospect of a future debt, doth not in my eye preponderate against the happy effects that may be probably consequential of the present plan; yet, as it is easy to foresee what use will be made of some mens conduct in case the war proves unsuccessful, I can't help thinking it the most bold and daring adventure, that has ever been enterprized; softened however by this, that the people desire a war with France, but without either calculating the expence, or giving themselves the trouble even to conjecture the consequence; and as the unsteadiness of the multitude is well known to all who reflect with any depth of attention, so notwithstanding the present plan may be the happiest that was ever designed, and I hope, will be attended with the success it

justly merits, yet as matters of this nature is like navigating in uncertain climates, amongst rocks, shoals, and quicksands; so it may not be in the power of the ablest pilot to extricate himself from the danger, it not so much depending on wit, spirit, and judgment, as on favourable and friendly weather.

In the formation of this scheme, a great extent of genius was not in any sense requisite; it being simply plain, that neither the court of Vienna, nor the states of Holland, either could, or would in earnest, support a barrier against France. The next reflection was very natural, that the French would soon be masters of the Netherlands, by that means open a free passage into Germany on that side, and at the same time either be absolute masters of the seven united provinces, or at least so powerful a neighbour as always to direct their measures.

This nobody could perceive better than the king of Prussia, whose inclination at once to save Hanover and Holland, exactly coincides with the notions of the British ministry; there was no great difficulty in bringing those together, whose sentiments
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were previously union'd: especially as there was not any thing in this scheme, that might eventually draw Great Britain into an unnecessary expence to defend what is in effect her own frontier, but only gratifying the undertaker with such possessions, as no other neighbour sovereign could with any advantage enjoy, because the wealth that was raised from, and should have defended them, was otherwise disposed. But here we see a prince his own minister and disposer, not the dupe of court parasites, but one who can make what has been an expence to other princes, turn finally to his advantage, to his honour, and to the interest of his country; opening a trade by the canal of Ostend, and through a tract of his own dominions into Germany; not that this point is so very clear as may be at first sight imagined, but it however exhibits to our view a character meriting the highest regard: an example worthy the imitation of every sovereign, and whom every subject of whatever nation may behold with pleasure.

This scheme is therefore not so much to be regarded in the general plan, as in the conducting of it to a crisis, through a

course of secrecy and address peculiar to the king of Prussia; for altho' the acquisition of country may be very certain, it is not quite so certain that any considerable trade will be thereby obtained. The attempt, however, is truly noble, and if it doth not succeed to his utmost wish, will very well answer the purpose of a subsidial treaty to Great Britain and to Hanover; to both which nations, it may in the hands of his Prussian majesty, become such a frontier as the arms of France will never be able to penetrate. But hence follows a very natural enquiry, why the troops of our old ally the queen of Hungary were not preferably employed to those of Russia, as they were nearer, and consequently more ready for service? To this an answer has been already publicly given, in a place where things of this nature are more particularly attended to, "that the Russians perform their contracts better;" which I verily believe, but I think that is not the true, at least, not the only reason.

To come at the truth, we must reflect a little back, and consider, whether any man in his senses, would trust to the aid
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of his neighbour in the acquisition of new dominions, who had before acquired from such neighbour, what was not willingly parted with. In this light it may easily be concluded, that the Russians were to be preferred, and as nothing more was required from us than such subsidiary troops, and the advantage probably to result sufficiently evident, it only remained on our part, to consider how far we could afford to engage. But on the part of the king of Prussia there were various other considerations, as he could not, perhaps, be trusted with the command of the Hungarian troops, or perhaps, he might not chuse to trust himself with the command of them, and it may perhaps be, that he neither approved of their muster rolls, or discipline.

A prince that is his own general, his own minister, his own treasurer, with an understanding suited, is not to be played with, like those under a different course of oeconomy; no favourites under him make indirect acquisition; no division and subdivision of the public wealth amongst commissaries and courtiers; what he bestows is the ample reward, and while the receiver

receiver gratefully accepts, the prince condescends to acknowledge his merit, it being equally to his honour to give where it is proper, as it is for the receiver to understand the propriety and value of the gift. But as to perquisites out of the public appropriations, and thereby instead of a real, a nominal army appears in the field, the shadow or ghost of an army, in no sense suits the maxims which direct this prince's conduct: therefore, I repeat again, it may be a reason why the Russians are to be prefer'd, as the court of Petersburg is not yet absorbed in the corruption and venality common to many other European states. Thus the Russians by a similarity of conduct, by their order, discipline, cloathing, exact observance of their engagements, punctuality of numbers, &c. effectually suit this prince's purpose, in preference to any other, and likewise the purpose of all who are mutually engaged.

There is another reason that may seem a little ludicrous, but has at the bottom something really substantial in it; it is, that a peace as naturally follows a treaty with the Russians, as an increase of pensions,

sions, an increase of the civil list, or, as an accumulate expence succeeds a vote of credit; but the reason of this is not perhaps, so generally understood. A good old woman of my acquaintance who has travelled in France, and, as the phrase is, seen the world, informs me of a prophecy, which makes every Frenchman as well as every Turk, startle at the name of Russian. If so, how much more is their approach to be dreaded, and still, how much more is our ministry to be applauded, who have found out the secret of terrifying the court of France into reason.

But as this terror of the French has not been yet so attended to, as to draw any happy conclusions therefrom, if our ministry are still in the same road of thinking, it will naturally lead us to enquire, what is to become of the king of Prussia's pretensions? and what of our affairs in America? and finally the public debt. This last article calls upon us to be very serious, and the others I conceive, sufficiently merit our attention.

I shall leave the Prussian interest to be considered another way, and at present only attend to the latter articles; and as first
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in order, of America, which I shall treat on the suppositions of a peace, and of a war, as it equally concerns us that something effectual be done therein, which way soever the hand of the political dial shall turn.

The first point as to America, is to confine the French within proper bounds ; the next to take such measures, and form such an establishment, as may keep them for the future within such bounds.

This establishment is presumed to be best effected, by the varying of the present form, and subjecting the whole tract of colonies, under one and the same governor, indistinct of all proprietary right, or private claim whatsoever. For which purpose, a scheme has been handed about, as a barrel thrown out of the ship of state, for the amusement of that huge leviathan the people, which has however, rather set them a staring than determined any thing : every body thinks it means something, but as they don't rightly know what, they therefore conclude nothing, and so leave it as they found it.

There seems, at first sight, to be a kind of solecism in the proposition, and many in the proposed scheme. I do not so much

trouble myself whether this scheme is a true one, presented to the ministry, the project of the ministry themselves, or the result of some inventive brain to amuse us, or whether in the nature and reason of things aught of this kind be practicable.

To thoroughly understand this, it is necessary to consider, whether in the common course of human affairs, the customary method of governors conducting themselves, will not most probably be the same hereafter, as heretofore, and whether, as the means of acquiring wealth may be greater than at present, men of a higher interest, and such as cannot easily be called to an account, will not be those employed. At the same time it seems strange, that any colony should expect to have their government more in the hands or power of the people, than is the constitution of their parental dam, by which they have been nursed and supported, unless the scheme be to set the happiness of the colony in so distinguished a light, as may charm over to them the inhabitants of their mother country, and to raise one: in effect, unpeople the other, drawing the

main strength from its natural situation, and weakning the basis on which it stands constructed. And yet it is plain, that either some such kind of government must be established, or the same inconveniency attend a general, as is the case at present of each individual government. Nor matters it as to the main question where the blame is, in the ministry, here, in their deputy there, or in the inhabitants, as the same cannot possibly be remedied by enlarging the bounds of power in either; and if the only end proposed, is as pretended to form a proper union against the French, I think there needeth not this extraordinary measure to attain it, and seems to me at the same time to be diametrically opposite to the fundamental principles whereon the scheme is built, as the enlarging of power, and narrowing of employments appears not, in any sense, proposed thereby; unless they mean to have a governor or viceroy, whom they may govern, instead of the crown, and dispose of all employments of the state as is customary in an independant common wealth, under an imaginary or nominal regent. If this be intended, they were better incorporated,

porated, electing a doge out of their own body, as I see not any reason why the government here should bear the expence, when the colony assumes all the power to themselves.

Plutarch tells us, that the government of Lacedæmon founded all their notions of justice on the agrandising of the state; therefore, the useful was the lawful. It was the same at Athens, at Thebes, &c. nor is it easy to say where it is not so; the policies of states are not governed by the maxims of private men, as the latter questions the justice, the former only the utility of an action; in which lights, the interests of states and that of individuals will ever stand contrasted, and both too commonly wander into the extremes, the one attempting to govern arbitrarily, the other not to be governed at all, which seems to be a good deal the case now before us, as the propositions tend to make the general governor no governor at all, and is contriving to form a union amongst people not disunited, while they seem only desirous to be so unioned as not in effect to be under any government except a tyranny of their own erection. Now the beauty of

the British constitution consists in this, that neither shall the king tyrannize over the people, nor the people over one another : and why this is not better than any new-fangled whims of government, modelled from the unpractised notions of Plato or Harrington, is to be made appear. We saw in 1648, what jargon such a chaos of conceptions produced at home, and what better are we to hope from abroad, where the same kind of people will principally preside, for they already say, that they would chuse to be governed by a new system, yet consent that their laws be the same as in England; that is to say, as near as may be, not seeming to apprehend, that systems and laws are calculated to suit each other, or that the best systems are evidently but mere theory, until their utility be confirmed by long experience; and why experiments are to be made at the expence of time, when all kind of governments have been considered, and at different times and places practised, is not easy to be conceived. Therefore, whenever I see a scheme the mere result of fancy, and which has only been thought of in a single light, I conclude the same is thrown out as mere matter

matter of amusement, to employ the writer, and divert the reader.

If a general governor be thought on, the plan is very easy and clear; the distinct governments and governors may remain as before, and when the wealth of the respective province is calculated, it is not difficult to allot them their quotas. The most power that can reasonably be vested in the supreme, is to preside in the great council, and execute the laws made by the people, and sanctified by the parliament of Great Britain, or as is done in similar cases by the king in council.

Some difficulties will naturally occur in the allotment of quotas, not as to their present situation, for that may be easy enough, but from their probable growth or improvement, by which one may vastly out-run the other, and when double the extent of ground and number of people will pay no more than at first. This the scheme hints some kind of remedy for, which is to have the number of representatives proportioned to the quota; but this doth not remedy the possibility, that some may rather be without representatives, than at any expence, when it will happen, as in

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our land-tax, that the disproportion will increase with the success and industry of the planters, and the value of one thousand pounds a year, pay less in one place, than four hundred in another; as is the case now of our northern and southern counties, the former being improving, the other long since improved to the utmost; so it must happen in the colonies, where we have seen Pennsylvania make a better acquisition in fifty, than Virginia in two hundred years; and the remedy of the proportion not so ready as may a first sight appear.

For if the tax is laid immediately as the land improves, it may mar industry, and impede such improvement, and to ascertain when, otherwise it should be laid, is the present difficulty; but however, rather difficult than impracticable.

There is besides, a vast variety of matter which schemers rarely reflect on, and which thoroughly to discuss, would be too extended for the present bounds of this design; but there is one article that seems so much superior to the rest, as to require our principal attention, who is to have the direction of the public money? I remember

ber in the readings on the reign of Charles the second, that the parliament took the disposition of the public money on themselves, and ordered it into the chamber of London, and then not well knowing what to do with it, ordered it back again to the treasury. It is certain, that the most a body of people can do to have the public money well disposed of, is to subject the person trusted to account: but here lyes the great difficulty; there is a kind of necessity that considerable sums be occasionally applied, the knowledge whereof is not to be opened in a public assembly. This, here, issues from the civil list, so not accountable for to parliament; and if a like allowance be made to a general governour in America, it is not very material who disposes of the rest, tho' even that may produce inconveniencies not at first perceived.

The disposition of public money, where the accounts are open and obvious, can be no otherwise a benefit to either the government or the assembly, than in the requisite employments, whereto they may recommend their friends; and as such a number of people are but little likely to agree, it seems
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most proper that it falls under the direction of one, and who that one must be is sufficiently apparent, as it would seem a strange thing to be at the head of a government, and the offices under it at the disposition of others, because they invigorate the active power, without which power, pre-eminence is ridiculous.

I am as sensible as any man can be, of the abuse of power, and of the artful misapplications of the public money independent of what is given without account: but this is a distemper in the body politic, like that of the gout in the body natural, rather to be eased than cured. If we have the example before us of rapacious ministers, and avaritious kings, so have we of commonwealths, where the abuse is still higher: wherever the people delegate power, it is to make themselves slaves to that power, and like a flock of sheep to be occasionally fleeced. But as without this power they would still be worse, some investment must be; and if any are so wise, as to be able to shew us, by clear and convincing proofs a better model, in practice, than our own, they would do well to declare it, for the common benefit of mankind.

Mr. Pope was pretty near the mark when he concluded, that is best which is best administered. In my humble opinion, untill men are angels, there is but little better or worse in any of them: the honest man is generally a weak man in the business of the world, and the cunning man always a thief. If the prince happens to be a man very knowing, he usually chuses a good honest simple person for his minister, as his use is only to do as he is bid, and to stand between him and the people; and if a good honest simple prince, the cunning statesman steps in and unguards him, and instead of being so stationed himself, sets the prince between him and the people.

For my part, it appears to me clearly, the people of Great Britain, &c. are less plundered than most other nations; as little as ministers from time to time can possibly afford; and when things are carried a good deal farther than some people like, it must be considered, that altho' the eagle sits on the rock and is seemingly adored, yet it is the cormorants that batten on the moor, and devour most of the provender.

Commonwealths are usually more rapacious than even absolute monarchies; at

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least, so it appears in most we know, otherwise the difference is only, that commonwealths prescribe for themselves, while in mixt monarchies the governing party are often so modest, as to leave it to their leader's discretion in what manner he will use his dispensing power, and in absolute monarchies the prince and his ministers commonly share.

Utopia is a very fine country, and our Americans much inclined to travel that way; but it is like some of the regions in romance, that vanish at mortal appearances. The best government, is that which does the most good, and least mischief. No prince, let his heart be ever so bad, can injure the people, materially, but by their own connivance; and the best rule to judge of a form of government, is, by the reputation that time has stamped on it: the experience of a single century will shew any sensible defects, which if not to be remedied without shocking the basis, must be suffered to subsist, tho' evidently prejudicial, and all colonies subject to such government, participate equally of the good and evil; but more especially when it cannot be clearly determined, either
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what appears so, be really an evil, or if really an evil, much time will be required to prove, that it is to be cured by the remedy proposed.

Men of warm imaginations are generally fond of any opinion, that at the first appearance gives them a prospect of rectitude, as they naturally love to mend every thing but themselves: struck with the conception, are a little too apt to determine before they think; and without examining in how many lights an opinion is subject to be varied, peremptorily resolve to-day, on what to-morrow they find reason enough to see they have been mistaken.

These are men of principle, but there are others ever railing at government, not that they want it amended, but to be in the way of making it worse. Both these are possessed with the same whims and pursue the like measures, tho' with very different views. It was a very honest answer of Oliver Cromwell, when demanded of him, what he would have done towards the rectification of government; "I know not what I would have, but I very well know what I would not have." The run of mankind are more presuming; they

know both what they would, and what they would not have, and therefore bewilder themselves in imaginary projects, otherwise it is plain enough, that they would not have the French interrupt their industry, or interfere in their trade; they would not have venal governors, nor would they be at a loss for a proper united strength, when the encroachments of the French call upon them to exert their best abilities: but the way to obtain these ends, they are not, perhaps, extremely clear in, it being more than probable, that while so many different interests clash, the means may be better understood than pursued. For if the natives expect to be under less restraint, or a different form of government than their parent country, the proprietors expect an unreasonable equivalent, and some here more power than really they ought to have, either all must be given up to the latter, or as to the form, all things continue as they are. But if no alteration should be in the form of government, a common treasury may be established, for the mutual benefit and protection of the respective colonies; in some cases the disposition specifically directed, and in others applied by the

the respective governours or their deputies in council assembled at some proper place, nearest the center of the whole.

I speak not this, as I would be thought either to direct, or advise, but merely as an intimation that a general governour is not absolutely necessary, and a matter of some consideration, whether safe, or proper; at all events this seems a point not necessary to be resolved on, until it may with the same degree of certainty be known, whether we are to continue the war, or shall be suddenly surpris'd into a peace.

It has been partly stated how the war is likely to turn on the behalf of either nation, and it may be freely remarked here, that a peace on right principles will probably be the best for both, supposing only the money account in question; for while it is doubtful which can hold out longest, it seems clearly the interest of both, not to put it to the hazard if it can be fairly avoided; but how to adjust such a peace, is attended with difficulties that are not to be easily surmounted.

To state this matter right, we must allow something to the reasoning of our adversaries, as well as to our own; their views
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are very probably what we suspect, and we with reason say, that as experience has demonstrated what kind of people they are, and how covetous of their neighbour's property in Europe, we have certainly a right to conclude that the genius and tempera-
 ture of their conduct, will not vary much on their being transported into America, and therefore are to be necessarily on our guard, and to avoid being eternally perplexed with litigious disputes about our boundaries, it is necessary once for all to have them perfectly settled, without which a peace will be extremely idle, and these boundaries not left to future decision, but actually included in the peace; as a future decision, is no decision at all, and an assembly of commissaries the mere objects of amusement. The French, on their part, complain that we extend our claims beyond all bounds of reason; that the lands which they occupy with the consent of the natives, are neither within our precincts, nor so near as to become dangerous; and that it seems very hard to be esteemed enemies, because they manage their colony affairs better than the English.

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The people of England have been told another story, that the French are fortifying within the colony precincts, and consequently propose, in due time, to become masters of the whole.

Now if the French believe what they say, and the English credit what they are told, it must follow, that in order to a peace, the French will deviate from what they assert, or the English consent to, and consequently establish the French claim, in its utmost extent, as has been heretofore done, to what they possess in Canada, at Cape Breton, and at Newfoundland. In either of which lights, the event seems doubtful to those who are not any way informed, by what mysterious steps our statesmen propose to ascend into the temple of peace with public approbation.

A war in public, is like a litigious chancery suit in private life, much easier engaged in, than handsomely concluded; commenced in a pet, and finished in a fit of despair. Men whose abilities are not of sufficient extent to take in the whole compass of things, nor form such a plan in the outset, as may enable him to make a fair judgment of the event, are like children

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playing at blind-man's-buff, where the blinded person diverts the rest with grasping at shadows. A just war judiciously entered into, by being properly prepared, is proved in the consequence, by a happy peace; and a foolish conclusion points out to us the direct contrary; as few people will be persuaded that when affairs turn out unhappily, it is owing to fate or accident.

The war, or something like a war, we are now engaged in, has the public approbation; the plan by which it is to be concluded, or the real end proposed, is not I presume known to many; the execution, in part, has been hitherto generally approved, in part not, as the nature of disputing with the French in America may not have been so well understood, as in Europe; and the only defect in the general plan seems to have been, the not supplying of the Americans in time with proper requisites. As it is, they seem to have no objection to the continuing of the war, so long as they can be well supplied, nor do I find that the English at home are in a different disposition. This turn of the people in favour of the ministerial schemes,

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so far gives them a kind of right, if they had no other, to demand a very good peace, a peace as salutary, as sound and permanent; a peace that may do honour to our arms and councils; a peace that may give a spirit to trade, and vigour to our commerce, that may inform our adversaries that we do not understand there is any material difference, between lying on the back of our colonies and intercepting our inland trade, and that c^d directly attempting to divest us of them: finally, such a peace, as on our part this century has not been acquainted with, that has as little similitude to Utrecht, and Aix-la-Chapelle, to triple, and quadruple and quinquiple alliances, or any other kind of treaties, provisos, truces, ministerial, embassadorial, commissarial, or otherwise; however, as possible, and what the people expect; it is hoped, they may once in a century or two, be obliged in, if it was for no other reason, than that they pay for it.

There is another reason, perhaps, as important as any I have mentioned; why, if a peace be made, we should be extremely secure, that it may not be easily broken;

which is, that on the conclusion, we shall have a flood of seamen, or of men that have been some time at sea; as likewise, of disbanded soldiers, totally unprovided for, as has ever been the case on the like occasions. These, must generally, either go abroad, or plunder at home; if the former proves the most eligible, and the court of France chuses to entertain them, they may besides their own seamen returned, engage, perhaps, twenty or thirty thousand of ours, and by surprizing us with a new war, turn the tables upon us. This, I believe, the reader will allow to be no chimera, and it may be still worse, if the money allotted should be otherwise employed, and not ready to discharge them with; as then the load will continue, though the war ends.

But the gratifying the people is not the only particular to be considered in concluding a peace; for would we make Britain for the future easy, our frontiers on the side of Germany must be secured, Holland barriered, and the king of Prussia so well established in the Netherlands, as that with the aid of proper subsidies, there may not be any future occasion for other troops, than what he will be able to supply

ply out of his own dominions, Hanover, Holland, and Great Britain. It may indeed happen, that some other prince of that race, may by this means, become master of both Holland and Hanover; but as this is only a distant prospect, should it ever so happen, it would only strengthen his hands against France, and by being master of the Hanover mines, and rich trading provinces of the Low Countries; he would then be our defender, without having any subsidial demands on Great Britain; the fortresses of France would shrink before him, like the sensitive plant at the approach of a mortal hand; the imperial troops, at his direction, would break in through Lorrain, Bar, and Alsatia, France be reduced to its primitive narrowness, and universal monarchy be for a time, interred in the Gallic ruins.

In respect to America many other difficulties occur, not more easily surmounted than those previously reasoned upon. The desire of grasping at more than we can enjoy, is the common fatality of our natures, and equally the foible of the prince and the people: it is policy to acquire from our neighbours, lest they should gain up-

on us, but it is simply avarice that induces us to desire what neither our neighbours possess, nor we ourselves can enjoy; and if this be thought of, to guard against future contingencies, I see not why, with a like parity of reasoning, we may not destroy all the shipping on the ocean, to prevent, some hundred years hence, our being invaded, is something like the happy reflection of a tenant in reversion, after the determination of a thousand years lease, pleased to think that his posterity shall one day enjoy a fine income.

Such thoughts in favour of posterity, would be of great importance in human life, were they less partial and confined; could we turn this avarice of individuals to public utility, or their fears and cares about what may never happen, into a due activity and provision against probable events, such a peace might be procured for them, as could not be reasonably objected to: but as matters now are circumstanced on both sides, it is not easy to conceive, how either the French or English are to be gratified to the extent of their respective wishes, the latter to enjoy in full security all their claim, and the former to have free
leave

leave to range over millions of acres they can never propose the cultivating a foot; and if both may not be so gratified, it is probable that both will desire a continuance of the war. A successful war cannot be the fate of both, and for either now to make a disadvantageous peace, will be placing themselves in the center of a whirlwind: I am very well apprised of what the people say here, and into the reasonableness of this event I shall now enquire.

There has been within the present century, various treaties, negotiations, conventions, &c. There has been the peace of Utrecht, and the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle; the latter two, I shall only at present, make some slight remarks upon. The former of them was made by the Torys, and therefore amongst other reasons, condemned by the Whiggs; the latter was made by the Whiggs, and therefore amongst other reasons, condemned by the Torys, and both alike bad in the current opinion of the people, because, say they, the latter was made upon exactly the same principles, as the former was found fault with for, that is to say, seemingly from a fear of reducing

cing the French too low; but they likewise at the same time recollect, that in the first, we had great advantages over the French by land, in the latter, by sea: that in the one we acquired Gibraltar, Minorca, St. Kits, and the demolition of Dunkirk; in the other, we assured the enemy we would deliver them what should be agreed upon. The eclat in these respective particulars was evidently distinguishable, and produces at last, some reflections on the honour of the nation, that may not be quite so prudent for me to exhibit. The enquiry from hence, is, how shall we manage to make another peace like the former, and yet quiet the minds of the people? because they will be apt to reflect, that as the public debt is increased, and to support that with honour, the taxes as high as they can well bear, and the nation no better secured against future insults than formerly; what must our taxes be in case of another war? The lowering of interest farther, will not in any sense answer the purpose, for as that is the same thing as annihilating, our credit will not on future emergencies be duly respected; and this
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I should think nearly equal to an unhappy peace.

The taxing of the public funds is much the same as lowering the interest; the levelling of a land-tax, or making it every where equal, would be in the opinion of the majority, the same as mounting it above four shillings in the pound, which they who are burthened say, is as much as the land will bear. And as no other tax can be laid, that will not equally affect the landed interest, nor, in an uncertain state, any more income from our commerce, it would seem that if we are left to our option, it may be thought more eligible by many, rather to hazard being ruined by a war, than to be certainly destroyed by in-exertion. This is, in truth, a miserable alternative, but what must a man do that is surrounded by thieves? he must either break the band, or submit to their mercy.

This is only to shew what would probably result from a peace at this critical juncture; if any such thing should be on bad terms attempted: we rejoiced in tears for the last, but however bad a war may in its nature be, another such peace, except
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by unavoidable necessity, will bring from us tears of blood; and therefore it is generally concluded, that the ministry are very clear in the game they have to play, or would not have so singularly deviated from their former systems. That Prussia is more than merely engaged in our interest, and that such his engagements will not only be supported by Great Britain, but by two other powers, either of which, when exerting their best abilities, singly a match for France; and as it is likewise presumed that his Sardinian Majesty has a share in the same measures, it is not easily imagined upon what foundation France can reasonably build any hopes of success, as that nation must herein prove herself an overmatch for all Europe; when perhaps, it is equally clear, that either Russia, the Empire, or Great Britain may severally be on a parity with her. If then she is without allies to balance the powers, and at the same time, two other princes of no light consequence interested in the common cause, it seems at least probable, that France will have too much business at home, to interfere in our American contests; and that she cannot have any allies, seems equally

equally probable from the following remarkable circumstances.

While the courts of Vienna and Berlin are in the same interest, and the Russians always ready to enter the empire, it is difficult to conceive whence any power can spring on that side in favour of France; and as in the present situation of affairs, Tuscany may be re-changed for Lorrain, &c. in favour of a younger branch of the Spanish monarchy, and Rouffillon recovered to the elder, to be effected by no other means than the present grand alliance, it necessarily follows, that the court of Spain will fall into the same interest, because the advantage is evident, and the interest mutual.

The resource of France, and what can only buoy her up with any hopes of extricating herself from the present dilemma, consists in two particulars, the one certain and evident, the other uncertain; the former is her own native power, wealth and address; the latter, the aid of the Ottoman Port: it does not yet appear, how this last is at present adjusted, but supposing it happens, it is distant and disjointed, and powers equal thereto remain in petto, to

be occasionally spirited up and engaged. And as to the compact situation of France, good management, good armies, and an immensity of fortifications, no doubt, will stand her in great stead; yet are the engagements against her so strong, that unless she can with her usual art, break the chain of the alliance, human foresight can hardly perceive wherein her preservation consists.

I shall mention one thing more, and that perhaps, the most material in favour of France: it is to be remembered, that it has heretofore been the common case, so indolently to drill on an advantageous war, as to make it too great a burthen to be borne: if this should happen now, France will at length be an over-match for us at home, had we double the armies proposed. We have hitherto treated her with the tenderness of a young virgin; she must now be attacked like a widow in her bloom, boarded at once, as the seamen, or stormed as the landmen phrase it, and if it shall prove, that our allies are for lengthening out the war, France is still as safe as if no such alliance had ever been.

Some men may reason, that our finances will hold out as long as those of France;

I answer

I answer positively no, not that we have less wealth, but shall expend infinitely more, if the difference was only, that ours must travel abroad, theirs remain at home. And it will be the same in America as in Europe, if what is proposed, is not pursued with spirit, and to the utmost extent of our powers; it is the crisis of our fate, or the fate of France, *Delenda est Carthago*, one must necessarily fall; but it would concern every Englishman that it shall be in our turn, merely for want of seizing the present moment, when all human aid seems to concur in our favour, and from whence we may have reason to promise our selves higher assistance, if we act as becomes us.

The charm which has so long suspended us to the view and amazement of Europe, that has hung us up in the chains of pusillanimity, and ravished from us a reputation the work of ages, is at length dissolved, those halcyon days in prospect, so long contended for, and with so much sollicitude desired, by that part of the nation who have nothing to do with the nonsense of parties. From this any ministry may see how much they will always be honoured,

red, who thus convince the people, that they neither want wisdom, nor inclination to serve their country.

England is not seeking after acquisition or extent of dominion in Europe, but aiming to obtain such frontiers, and putting them in such hands as may be best enabled to guard our liberties and secure our trade, by making the interest of Britain the common interest of her allies, gratifying them with lands and towns, and by such gratifications, guaranteeing and preserving her own wealth, ease, and importance. And while it is the apparent interest of each to contribute to her happiness, they will be too wise to renounce an alliance so eminently a common benefit.

Spain, no doubt, has farther views than at first sight appears, as it will hardly be presumed that nation can see with pleasure, so potent a people as the French, gradually attempting to force from her the mines of Mexico; nor on the other side, can the king of Prussia with pleasure, observe a power growing upon the Empire, that his posterity may have reasonable expectation one day to govern. Sardinia, as matters have hitherto stood, has
always

always been at the mercy of France, the king of the Sicilies little better than a subject of that crown, and the Dutch bandied about like a shuttle-cock. The Russian government cannot easily forget the practices of her agents, nor Saxony, what that electorate has suffered? In short, the ravages in the Palatinate, the ruin of the Barrier towns, and the known public insults on the court of Vienna, call upon fate to interweave resentment with interest, and by the united force and power of them all, to level France with the meanest of her neighbours.

As upon this plan it is to be presumed that the king of Prussia is to have territorial dominion to the Germanic ocean, Sardinia, from the western confines of the Milanese to the Mediteranean, the younger branch of Spain, augmentation of lands in Italy, the elder recovery of long lost countrys, and the emperor be enabled to resume his native rights, naturally falling into the house of Austria; so will France by this means be properly bounded, yet with sufficient interest in Europe for the good of the people, but at the same time, the curb sufficiently severe on the crown as to prevent

vent for the future any prospect of triumphing over its neighbours, which has hitherto rather contributed to decorate that crown with dear purchased jewels, than been of any benefit to its subjects, whose blood, treasure, and liberties have all been sacrificed to the vain ideal pursuits of universal monarchy.

Hence it should seem, that this important alliance is not only calculated for the security of the respective interested states, but also for the common good of mankind; and while it confines France within due bounds, it barriers all Europe against that once rising power by whose assistance France has been hitherto enabled to carry her dangerous projects into execution. And however it may seem, that we are extending our views beyond even the boundaries of knight errantry, it is yet undoubtedly true, and the effect will probably be, that Persia will one day share herein, and maintain a power in opposition to that of the Ottomans, to the like purpose as the Ottomans have been used by France against the house of Austria; and how much farther this scheme may yet extend, I shall wave for the present mentioning, as I would
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not seem to amuse the reader with matter, that may rather amaze and confound, than instruct or inform him.

As to the affairs of Germany in particular, I need not add that Cologne must follow the interest of Bavaria, or that Bavaria is not in condition to interrupt the common interest of the empire, and of the alliance; on the contrary, must necessarily court and cherish it, as the natural means of its own preservation.

I am not aware that hence will spring a new protestant electorate, and two powerful monarchies, nor that France will insinuate to the Dutch and Genoeſe, that they must one day change their masters; but this admitted, it will not be to the prejudice of either. As it is the common interest of mankind, that neither be for the future governed by the politics of France, as upon the bottom they are neither can long subsist; and while it is almost impossible for any sovereign to govern the Dutch but upon free principle, so neither can Genoa suffer a master long but on the like principles; and it is more than probable that the subjects of both will generally agree, that it is better to be under some regular,

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compact

compact and uniform government, than in effect under none at all; for as of all things, confusion is the worst, as that is the present state of Genoa, and only checked in Holland by the house of Orange, should that family fail, all their affairs will probably return to their former disorder; and as they must necessarily become the prey of some power, they will doubtless conclude that power best who is of their own religion, and most likely to continue them a free state. As to their becoming the subjects of Great Britain, which may be invidiously intimated, it can neither be the interest, or inclination of either; as if I may so speak, such concord will naturally produce a discord, that may eventually destroy that harmonious union, so long amicably subsisting between the two nations, and which is more likely to subsist in separate, than in connected power.

On the event of this, if it proves as fortunate as human reason may presume, the trade of Europe will probably in a course of time take quite a new turn, when the beauty of our conduct may consist in artfully improving our own, while we turn that of France into a new channel, depending

ing perhaps, more on good laws well executed at home, than on any other arts or attainments. But as this, I hope, is the main end in prospect, so it intimately concerns us to consider, that if the present refined, or rather solid, politics take place for the common advantage, we may not be so wanting to our selves, in a due course of laudable industry, and honourable dealings, that while we may make so distinguished a figure in the world, by being the main instrument in reducing the power of France, we shall not have occasion to quarrel, on account of trade, with those who have assisted us herein; otherwise, this, instead of being a happy, may prove fatal crisis, and we be again reduced to the miserable necessity of raising that power to our aid, whom we are now aiming to reduce, and again put into their hands the scales of Europe, whom we are now endeavouring to exclude from any share in the common balance.

F I N I S.